Wednesday, August 23, 2006

6 May 'Moussaoui's trial : Fight a death wish with a life sentance..."

(originally posted 6 May. Reposted here)
Three cheers for the jury in the Moussaoui trial - for one of the more dignified responses to the 911 atrocity.
Here was perhaps the one culprit they actually had in their hands, involved in a terrible crime and part of an even more terrible movement - and yet they managed not to follow their own government in bringing things down to his level.

That the death penalty is considered for any crime I have to admit I consider quite primitive, but in the case of a suicide attacker, it makes no rational as well as no moral sense.

Normally, one of three justifications are given for the death penalty, and in this case especially, none of the three hold water.
Firstly, there is the notion of deterrance - that the ultimate punishment will dissuade all but the most incorrigible villains. However whether something is a punishment or not depends on your world view. For a normal individual to be put to death is perhaps the worst that can happen - but for a suicide attacker? One who not only wanted to die in his attack, but actively looks forward to a paradise that he thinks awaits him if he is killed in his 'war'? Is the message supposed to be 'don't try and kill yourself attacking us, because if you're caught, you'll be killed'?! Not the strongest of deterrants!

The second common justification is that is 'just' punishment. In other words, regardless of whether it deters, the punishment must match the crime, and therefore murder should be met with death. This might perhaps be seen as providing a 'balance' which can underpin a justice system. Sentances in this view are not only designed to stop future crimes, but really to punish those that are committed. The question one has to ask here is 'qui bono'? What is gained from the death penalty? If the criminal is already removed from society then the menace has been dealt with, and while the costs of a imprisonment are high, the costs of the countless appeal procedures are also not insignificant - and are we to base justice on cost anyway?
It has to be admitted that this counter argument would undermine any notion of punishment that was over and above prevention. If someone promised or could physically not do a crime again, then aside from pure 'punishment' there would be no reason to do anything to them. So punishment of some form, for pure punishment's sake, is needed.
But the death penalty cannot be viewed this way. The notion that the punishment should match the deed fits well into the notions necessary for justice, but in the case of the death penalty, the punishement resembles the deed. It would be to kill because they violated an ideology, which is exactly the viewpoint that Moussaoui would use to justify his attempted murder - America violates his ideology.
If the punishment resembles the crime, then we are back to an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and not only as Ghandi said, might the whole world go blind, but more importantly, it leads to a world of eye gougers and tooth pullers - which is worse, since makes us not only the victims, but the perpetrators of crimes.

An eye for an eye though is perhaps the most honest justfication of the death penalty. Pure, naked, revenge. Desire for revenge often seems a normal response, and as such might be considered 'therapeutic' in some way, and hence justifiable since it might yield some benefit for the society - and help it recover from it's wound. But even on a personal level, while often what we want, revenge is rarely what we need. And on a state level, it most definately isn't so. So while revenge might be the most honest pillar of support for the death penalty, and the one quietly supporting the other justifications, few people would openly admit it, and that alone shows there is something tacitly acknowledged to be wrong about it.

So, in my view in all cases, but especially in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, there is no point, no advantage, and no right in putting him to death, and if we want to deal with such people, we have to look for other punishments.

Unfortunately of course there is often not much to be done with his ilk. Deterrants don't work, no satisfaction comes from punishment, and little is to be gained whatever we do.

But life imprisonment is perhaps the least worst of all options. As a deterrant, it shows that a failed suicide attacker will be left to rot in a cell, and rather than going out with a glorious bang, will die 'with a whimper'. As a punishment, it is in the eyes of those who would do such things definately a terrible one - since it denies them what they most crave. And as a practicality, who knows? Maybe after many years contemplating his and this life, such a person might eventually, with admittedly small possibility, regret what they've done, and see the world otherwise. And as an example and a tool in the war against those who still have such perverted views, this would definately be an asset. So since he wanted death, and sought to end his and other's lives, give him in response, life, without parole.

For 'life, without parole' captures perhaps what such fanatics are most missing, and what any member of modern society has to accept. This life which we're blessed or shackled with depending on your viewpoint, whatever else it is, is a reality, and the only sure way of dealing with it is based on that reality. A suicidal fanatic might be trying to break out of this life, but they only do so because they conceive of another one that they can escape to. Whether suicidal or not, agressive or not, the problem with religious fanaticism is it seeks to portray this life as an inferior and insignificant phase in the midst of a more important and eternal one. And having made this initial leap, they are nothing but logical in wanting to bend the ways of this life, to the (supposed) ways of the other one.
But whether we like it or not, or think it's everything or not, we all have this life sentance, and whether materialist or religious, as long as not extremist, one has to agree that we should do justice to it. That means living it for what it is, and not trying to destroy it in the name of what might come after.

So, by sentancing Moussaoui to life imprisonment, by forcing him to live out both his sentances in entirety, we are truly defending our way of life, against those that wish to destroy it.

16 March 'Munich - important issues, but much missing...'

(originally posted 16 March. Reposted here)
I just saw Munich recently, and was disappointed so little was made of what was a tragic yet fascinating event. The murder of the Israeli hostages, and the subsequent hunt and killing of those deemed responsible, showed the depths reached by both sides in this unending conflict. On the one hand there was a radical palestinian faction kidnapping and killing innocent atheletes, on the other was a democratic country deciding to act outside of both it's own and international law, not just for pre-emption, but also for revenge.

One film is of course too short to handle all aspects of any story properly, but even still Spielberg concentrated largely on the actions of one side - Israel. The palestinian side was portrayed mainly from the news bulletin perspective, and apart from a brief speech given by a PLO activist, no insight was given into how they had reached this bloody stage. This is not to dimish the actions of Black September, but just to point out that apart from the basic newsreel facts of what happened, the film gave no insight into why they did what they did.
Which, given the time limitations, is fair enough. Indeed, while it is of course important to understand the actions of reactionary forces which are often alien to us, it is perhaps sometimes more important to examine the action of the governments and societies which they are reacting to/against - since these are our governments, and so their actions are in a small part ours too.
I am not an Israeli, and of course only a handful of Israelis are ultimately involved in choosing such actions as targeted assination, but Isreal as a democratic, modern country, is a member of a club of which we are all members (if we live in non-authoritarian regimes) or at least aspire to be (if we don't), and how one member acts has significance for the club as a whole.

So examining just the Israeli side of things is a worthy exercise, since it tells us about how 'our' kind of countries might act, if the same thing happened to them. This I think explains why sometimes there seems to be a contradiction between how upset some people get about Israeli actions, when those actions while brutal, often pale beside the deeds of some other countries and groups. The reason I think is this sense that it as a country is 'one of us'. NOT in a 'western', Judeo-Chrisitan sense, but as a democratic and modern country. And as 'one of us' we have perhaps stronger feelings on how 'we' should (or would) behave then when confronting appalling acts by groups less easy to identify with. While not perfect, this slightly imbalanced view is actually quite a good way of looking at things - since it focuses on the problems of 'our' systems - and does not just blame everything on incomprehendable 'other' systems. And it will hopefully stop us from destorying our system in the name of preserving it. It is not just 'evil-doers' that cause problems in the world...

So it is fair enough that the film dealt primarily with the Israeli response, doing so by personifying the hunt in the figure of Avner, the leader of one of the assination teams. He was portrayed as having a young family he wanted to protect, being concerned about innocent civilians, and haunted by the thoughts of the atheletes' final moments, all of which can be used as a metaphor for how a leader might feel about a country in times of crisis. However what is of relevence in the Munich incident is not the actions of one man, or even of a radical group, but the conscious adoption of a contorversial (and illegal) policy by a modern country. And when examing a policy it is not enough to simply look at its background and execution as one might do when trying to understand or judge a man's actions. Instead, with a policy, what is of more importance is not where it comes from, but where it leads to, and this was not properly covered by the film. What is so confusing about this is there was one very clear tragic consequence of Operation Bayonet, the killing of an innocent waiter by another Israeli team, which was blaringly conspicious by its absence. Whatever about the justification - punishment, revenge or pre-emption - in extra-judicially killing the members of Black September, there is no doubt possible that the killing of an innocent waiter who had nothing to do with it is also a tragic and critically important element to the whole Munich story. Even if we grant a death penalty is needed, and even if the guilt of those involved can be decided without using the normal legal processes, then there is still the looming question of whether it is better that one innocent man dies than 10 guilty men live. To me the fact that the film ignored this issue makes it fundamentally flawed. What is most concerning about this is the fact that most people will only know the Munich incident through the film - and at a time when shoot-to-kill and pre-emptive policies are current issues - this is downright irresponsible.

12 March 'cultures don't clash, fundamentalists do...'

(originally posted 12 March. reposted here)
Going back to the 'cartoon controversy' - there was an interesting article on it by Karren Armstrong in the Guardian on saturday

http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1728649,00.html


She made the very good point that what was involved was not just one set of sacred values, but two. Of course there was the sacredness which Muslims attribute to the prophet, but on the supposed 'other' side there was also the sacred value of free speech, which being considered by some people in some societies to be unassailable or inviolable, is in practice just as 'sacred' as any religious concept.

"The sacred symbolises that which is inviolable, nonnegotiable, and so central to our identity that, when it is injured in any way, it seems to vitiate the deepest self."

The notion that these issues were 'central to our identity' explains how passions were raised, and then easily inflamed. People on both sides seemed to feel there was a need to 'defend' their values, indicating an underlying assumption that these values were under attack, and implying they are somehow in opposition to those held by the others. This idea of an 'attack' on core values, things which define a society and its people, is what is being ascribed to in the oft repeated catchphrase of a 'clash' of civilizations or cultures.

Of course, what has to be admitted from the start, is a true clash of cultures is indeed possible. If two cultures have differing opinions not merely on how people should behave, but on how they should be made behave, then there is indeed going to be a conflict as soon as these cultures interact, and one with little hope of reconciliation. What is important and necessary however is the element of coercion, the idea that the values are not something to be aspired to but also imposed on others, and hence makes it logically impossible that the two different value systems can co-exist. People can't be forced to do two different things.

But what must also be realised is for there to be society at all some values must be imposed on its members. As I mentioned before, true freedom is freedom only to do the things that matter, not a licence to do anything. In western society no one doubts that people should be forced to obey certain laws, and prevented from and punished for breaking them. The value of an individual's freedom of action does not extend to the freedom to steal and kill others. This imposition of values is not merely a relativist preference, but a prequisite for there to be this society at all, and something to be defended without compromise, if it is indeed under attack.

But is it? Are there immovable tenets of Western society in conflict with another, different, 'Islamic' society? First of all it is not clear what this supposed supra-entity of Islamic society is supposed to be exactly, nor for that matter, the Western one. Both 'societies' encompass a multitude of different races, religions and political systems - and in many areas overlap. And the fact that they overlap shows that they cannot be so incompatible.
The conflict, if any, comes not from a clash of radically different cultures, but radical elements within those cultures. It is fundamentalism in cultures, not their founding values, that is the main cause of conflict, and a source of concern for all those involved.

For me 'fundamentalist' implies not merely taking a set of values extremely seriously, but imposing those values on others. There is a switch in emphasis from the personal to the communal. Values are no longer sacred rules which grant the individual merit if he/she obeys them, but rather which grant merit if the individual contributes to them being obeyed. Fundamentalists are extroverted in that they get involved in the affairs of others. Of course, to some extent we are all fundamentalists to the extent that we would help or at least support the upholding of the law even if we ourselves were not affected by the particular crime. But the pragmatic reason for this is that as part of a society which does better if criminality is kept down, we are all affected by any crime. If the criminal gets away with something this time, then it might encourage others to act similarly, and next time we might be the victim. So there are valid practical reasons for sometimes imposing our values on others, even if it doesn't directly concern us. But the element of 'fundamentalism' I'm trying to get at is when this imposition has no practical value, and is done for idealogical reasons.

It would seem religious values are the most susceptible to this. Perhaps because in a way punishing or preventing immoral acts is seen as doing a service in the name of the religion, and hence providing kudos in the eyes of the deity (which has to be a good thing in such matters). But to me this is the ultimate in arrogance. Any notion of a deity implies something at least more powerful than oneself, and if one has to act on its behalf, then it suggests the deity needs the help of the individual, something which is not only arrogant, but ultimately illogical. If a God needs me to act on His behalf, then He is not much of a God. In addition it causes problems for the whole notion of moral guilt. If a person is to be judged by his actions, then how can he be judged if his actions are forced by others? In the example of the cartoons of the prophet - does the prophet need to be protected from people drawing his caricature? Those who follow him may not want to offend him - but surely it only makes logical sense to be sure that they don't, or condone those who do. To imply a deity needs to be protected from offence is in my view more a slur on the deity than the offence itself.

But I think the people protesting against the cartoons were not driven by mere demands that their values not be broken. Aside from an inflaming radical element I think that the majority around the world were demanding rather that their values be respected, which is something else. Given the tensions in the world I think a large part of the anger was (I hope) due mainly to a perceived attack on what they hold dear, not anger that others don't act the same way, and hence not a sign of ideological imperialism.

Of course secularists can impose their values ideologically as well, meaning doing so when there is no practical reason or tangible benefit. It may be an imposition of values to force all women to wear a headscarf, but in my view it is also an imposition to forbid them to do so if they wish. In my opinion, the laws banning religious symbolism in France do not serve a clear purpose, except to target religion per se, and this is an ideological manoeuvere, not a practical one. An article of clothing is only banned if it is a a religious symbol - but unless they can be shown to have a clear negative impact on society (as for example a swastika might be, given its connotations) there is no reason to ban them as such, even in limited areas such as public buildings. In this case I think it is even counterproductive, since symbols are only significant to society at large if they are made so. Turbans and headscarves, skull caps and crucifixes only have significance to those who don't wear them if they are hyped to believe them as meaningful symbols, symbols that say something to them. Otherwise how could they matter? Banning them, drawing attention to them, ironically draws attention to them and makes them bones of contention. On an aside, from a technical point of view it could be argued that since symbols are only symbols to those who believe in them, then judging someone else's symbols is impossible. To you it might be a crucifix, if I am not a Christian it's just a piece of wood. And if it is to me a piece of wood - how can I justify banning it?

So in all areas, we can have fundamentalism, and in all areas I think it is dangerous. It is dangerous because it replaces how society needs people to behave with notions of how they should behave which are divorced from practical concerns. And if they are not defensible on practical grounds, then they are not defensible at all.

Without this fundementalist attitude, quite different views on how people should live can be accomodated under an umbrella society of how they at the very least must live. This is what happens anyway in all societies, most of all in modern democratic ones, where differing opinions are tolerated as long as they don't interrupt the functioning of that society.

The onus of toleration is perhaps more on the majority,since they are the ones with the power to do most damage, but a minority has also to be careful never to define themselves in opposition to others, as is a often a natural reaction of solidarity when times get hard.
This is not to blame any minority for being different, and imply they must 'integrate', but rather to say that that difference must be compatible with the society formed by everyone together. Compatible in the sense of not preventing its functioning, and radical extremists aside, that so far seems to be the case. Sadly even perceived difference, and perceived self-isolation can quickly lead to escalating tensions. Europe stands with the worst of them in terms of how it has often tolerated minorities, and as the perhaps very worst in what it eventually led to. The West has taught the world some terrible lessons, but that means we have also had the best opportunity to learn from them.

5 March 'naturally good? not necessarily'

(originally posted 5 March, reposted here)
Although it was broadcast a few weeks ago, finally got around to watching the last episode of BBC2's "Alternative Medicine - the evidence", on herbalism.

(http://www.open2.net/alternativemedicine/programme3.html)

For me the debate about herbalism is more than just a simple question of whether certain herbs have medicinal effect or not, but also says something about how science fits in to our modern society, in people's perceptions, and in practice.

While people are right to be always a bit sceptical about all claims, scientific or otherwise, I find it worrying that in the area of health people are often so ready to think that something which is not manufactured is therefore more 'natural' and thus always better.
Being honest, I find 'natural' an oft abused and even incoherent concept. Not everything on this planet has always existed, or at least in it's current shape and form, so what is 'natural' will always have an element of parochial prejudice about it - what is natural for us might have been modern for previous ages, and so on. Natural in the sense of 'naturally occuring' is perhaps what is generally meant, but this hides an important shift in emphasis from what something is, to where it comes from. Any chemical, especially a medicine, must be judged by what it is, and more specifically how it behaves, rather than by where it comes from. Just because something is produced in a lab does not make it bad, in fact it is more often than not a purified and carefully controlled version of something first seen in nature. Nor is something good simply because it is 'found' in nature - as the many naturally occuring poisons and toxins show. The poppy gives us morphine, but can also be heroine. 'Natural' can be beneficial and dangerous at the same time.

That doesn't mean I always think artificial is best. For example in the realm of nutrition, I am often of the opinion that supplements etc. cannot compare with eating the plants that contain the substances being copied. But this is not because the substances are somehow more 'natural' in the plants, the substance is the same whether created in a lab or a lettuce, but I am not convinced that all the necessary substances are being supplemented, or that their combinational effect is the same as in the plant.

With nutrition, there are very good reasons why the thing itself can be relied upon - because our bodies have adapted to use the plant, and therefore the two are perfectly matched. Of course it is in theory possible to make supplements that provide everything without the hassle of eating a lettuce, but given the likelihood that something is being lost, it's easier to just have a salad.
Similarly it is possible that a supplement might be actually better than what is found in the plant - and some how 'hyper-stimulate' some beneficial function, but the odds are against it. Our gut has been doing trials with the lettuce for millenia, longer than any lab has been going.

However there is an important reason why this argument does not apply to medicine. The fact that for most of our history we had to survive on unprocessed plants necessarily shows we are adapted to live off these plants. If we weren't, we wouldn't be here. The same reasoning cannot be applied to the use of plants in medicine, since there is not the evolutionary dependence involved. Non-instinctive usage of herbs must rely on the existence of culture, and even language, which does not leave enough evolutionary time available. Given in addition the isolation of original cultures, even from a cultural evolutionary perspective this is unfeasible. While it might be possible that the usage of plant X consistently in a group might favour a gene pool which had positive reactions to plant X, the time and isolation of groups in earlier history would make it highly unlikely that the same gene pressure would exist in humanity at large. An example of how different groups handle natural substances differently is lactose intolerance - which while widespread throughout humanity is more predominant in certain ethnic groups, groups which in there history did not perhaps rely on dairy products as much as for example Europeans. Even with foodstuffs, while there are plenty of very beneficial plants out there, it is science and research more than human tradition which tells us nowadays which of them are most beneficial. For a long time red meat was traditionally seen as a healthier, supperior food, but this was largely due to its relative expense, and the assumption that the more something cost the better it was. There is more to our co-evolution with our food than human tradition can tell us alone.

And of course it it can be said that the very point of medicines is to counteract what might be viewed as 'natural' events - sickness and ultimately death are the most natural things describable - all part of the cycle of life. But in medicine mankind is trying to 'improve' on nature i.e. change the course of nature to something it thinks is 'better' - namely longer and healthier life. When people talk about preferring a 'natural' birth, they should realise that 'naturally' 75% of children wouldn't reach adulthood. What is very very natural in this case could hardly be considered 'good' by anyone. The evolutionary cycle only helps us long enough to reproduce. For things after or outside of this, we must often turn to our own devices.

There are 2 types of medicine, that which works, and that which doesn't
This is of course not to deny that some herbs work, perhaps in some cases better than currently available modern medicines. But the point which worries me is that people often forget they are not better because they are herbs, but they are better if they can be shown to work, and without side effects. And if a herb is studied and understood to the point which this happens, then it can (and should) be artificially reproduced, its dosages controlled, and it become a cure. Until that happens it is NOT a cure, but a 'guess' at one....perhaps an informed guess, based on tradition, but a guess nonetheless. For me medicines mean substances which have been scientifically shown to be real cures, if not perfect or absolute ones.

The basic point is that for something to be a true medicine, something which we should use on ourselves to improve our health, it has to be known (i.e. shown) to have a positive effect. And 'tradition' while a good indicator of starting points for research, is on it's own not a reliable enough source of knowledge, especially since if something is strong enough to have an effect, it is strong enough to have a bad effect (and if it is not strong enough to have an effect, there is no point in taking it).

And of course what is a 'good' effect is something that must be objectively decided, and the only way to do this is by trials which study the changes, both regarding the ailment to be cured, and any possible side effects. Of course this applies to modern drugs as well, which is why there are such trials. But in the case of modern drugs there is much more regulation, not least because the companies behind them can be sued. Perhaps it is the lack of legal responsibility ('Nature' can't be sued) that leads to the lack of such rigourous regulation in the herbal area....though there are no health-related reasons why there should not be. Anything is dangerous if not studied, regardless where it comes from.


Some work, so why so many neglected?


The most interesting thing that arose for me out of the programme, was not the fact that herbalism is on the rise in the modern world, but that the whole area seemed to be so neglected by modern research. One would have thought that if there are some herbs which have some promising effects, then it would be in the interests of both society and industry to study and isolate, and commercialize the active ingredients. First of all there is a very real danger that active substances are being supplied and consumed with out real knowledge about how and why they work. Second of all, and more tragic and incomprehensible, is how many possible new leads in not only substances but how their combinations function, is being ignored.

There are two possible and depressing reasons which might contribute to this state of affairs. Firstly, proper research is such a costly and time consuming exercise, that the bulk of it is probably only done by well financed sources, namely the pharmaceutical companies. As a result, the necessary sums will only be invested if the returns will be profitable. This means it will always be the big western conditions which will be targetted primarily, since it is this market which will fork out for the final products. In addition, most herbal remedies do not claim or seem to be particularly strong - and a lot held by 'mild relief' from symptoms for everyday annoyances rather than life-threatening diseases - and it might be that such ills do not generate the necessary revenue. While there is commercial potential for a drug that 'completely' relieves pain - is there the same market for ones that 'slightly' relieve symptoms? Perhaps, but the business case is not as strong - if i have a debilitating headache I am likely to pay more than if I have a midly irritating rash.
But some herbal claims do target really important diseases - in the programme there was an example of a herb in South Africe being (seemingly successfully) used to care for AIDS patients. So why are such herbs being heavily researched? The second reason, also quite skeptical, is that perhap there is not the same potential for 'owning' a natural remedy if one spends a lot of time and money showing it to be effective. It is understandable that big business won't basically waste it's money on studying how good something is that can be found outside everyone's door....but it is less understandable why society as whole doesn't.

22 Feb 'free speech in europe'?

(originally posted 22 Feb. reposted here)

Freedom of speech was in the news again this week, in this instance an example of how it is sometimes restricted in Europe, as David Irving was jailed in Austria charged on Holocaust Denial charges.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/farright/story/0,,1714403,00.html


and of course the other week Abu Hamza was jailed on charges relating to incitement to racial hatred.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1704625,00.html

Given the recent protestations about freedom of speech, it might be asked if this is an example of European hypocrisy,since attacks on Muslim tradition are defended, whereas attacks on European/Jewish history are prosecuted?

The answer is no, but some people might at first think otherwise, because 'freedom of expression' is not really as it sounds, at least not at the moment.

Despite being much touted recently, in European countries there is most definately not absolute freedom of speech. Just as we are free in our actions only as long as we don't harm others, similarly we are only free in our words in similar way. So there are actually two questions involved. The first, which is not what I want to address at the moment, is whether any restriction on freedom of expression is ultimately justified. I am inclined to the view that while it is abhorrent to think that preachers of hatred and lies should be allowed spew their vitriol unchecked,there are strong philosophical arguments that any form of censorship is indefensible, even on practical grounds. Having certain things that cannot be said assumes that there is a general agreement about these things - and (more importantly) yields a power of suppression to government which can always be seen as the thin end of the wedge.

However there is also the fact that in a society absolute freedom is actually impossible. To be free to do anything does not broaden our possibilities, but rather limits them, since it exposes the individual to the ambitions and cruelties of others, and makes impossible the interdependent structures which provide more than could ever be achieved by even the strongest on their own.
To be free to attain the things that matter, to make those things possible, requires giving up some freedoms which are less important. To be free to accumulate wealth I must give up the freedom to try and take that wealth from others, since in doing so I am protected from them doing the same to me. Thus there is no such thing as total freedom possible, only a limited freedom, but one that encompasses the things that can be considered important and attainable.

This is why it is not a contradiction to call a 'free' society one where there are indeed limitations and restrictions, defined by law, and imposed by the state. Since violence and crime generally prevent people going about their business, the freedom to do these things is part of the freedom that has to be given up in order that we can be free in other ways. In my view there is no arguing against this, at least as far as actions are concerned.

However, in line with restricting actions, which can be easily seen to affect society directly, there are also restrictions on what we say, which can be viewed as affecting society indirectly. Whether this is ultimately the best course of action is debatable, but I won't get into it here. Perhaps it is not the ideal reaction, but it admittedly might be a necessary one. There is no doubt that one person can through words incite a group to do more harm than he/she could ever do on their own.

So let's grant this for the moment, which leads us to the second question, the one I want to deal with here. That is, are the restrictions or lack of them, as evidenced in the media recently, coherent, or do they reveal bias and hypocrisy?

To answer this we must keep in mind why any restriction is necessary - to allow society to function and to facilitate the freedom we really need. Hence, just as the actions which are prohibited are largely those which cause physical damage to person or property, so could this be logically extended to any comments that result in such damage.

In the case of Abu Hamza this seems to be the case. Examples of the charges on which he was convicted were "soliciting/encouragment to murder" and "using words or behaviour with intent to stir up racial hatred", and this means his comments were seen as potentially causing injury and even death to innocent people.

It might be argued that he did not personally kill or harm anyone and should not be responsible for the actions of others, and in addition that the crimes he is blamed for were 'potential' crimes, and that in our society we do not punish people for crimes that 'might' occur, however likely. However, it needs to be realised that in terms of intent and effect, pulling the trigger of a gun (which fires the bullet, which hits the body, which kills the man) is in the same class of 'action' as convincing someone to go out and get a gun (and pull the trigger, to fire the bullet...) The intent of his actions was that people would be killed. The effect of his actions is that people most probably would be. It is not that he is being punished by crimes that have not yet occurred, but for crimes which have not yet completed. People might not have yet been harmed/killed, but the chain of events which he wilfully initiated, was underway. In this way it is no different to pulling the trigger but being caught before managing to hit the target.

The Irving case is different however. Denying the holocaust, while objectionable for obvious reasons, can not easily be shown to lead to direct physical injury. The fact of the holocaust has to be accepted given the scientific and logical reasoning we accept in society (and need to accept for there to be that society) - but ignoring that reasoning cannot be a crime in itself. To deny what can be shown to be historical fact is stupid, and in cases like this undeniably malicious, but can not be considered to be in principle a cause of harm. Indeed, the world is full of people with their own particular views of history (religious or otherwise) which might validly be considered logically or scientifically mistaken - but we do not (and should not) make this a crime as such.

So I think the general theory that supports some restriction of free speech cannot support jailing Irving.

But not all laws stem from grand philosophical principles, and a lot of them, instead come about to tackle particular problems. The laws under which Irving was prosecuted I think are an example of this - because there was (and perhaps still is) a very real need to stamp out holocaust denial, not because of the act of denial of history itself, but of the specific circumstances.
The holocaust was such a traumatic event in the Europe's history that there are lessons which must not be forgotten, and while in an ideal society lies would be ignored, the unfortunate fact is that in the modern world they can cause real damage. In order for society to progress it might sometimes be necessary to draw a line under some debates so that we can all move on.
I would think that this logic could be applied to Irvings case, and that it could be argued that the issue of the holocaust for Europe (and especially Austria) is just too important to let it continue to be questioned, because there is a very real problem that such questioning inflames and destabilizes society.

The main point however is that Irving's prosecution can not be viewed as part of a general restriction on free speech, but a particular reaction to a particular problem, which happens to limit free speech. This itself is of course something which can (and I think should) be evaluated...but not here.

So finally what about the cartoons of the prophet? There is obviously in Europe no specific law against such caricatures, no specific prohibition as for Holocaust denial, so they are not related to the Irving case.

But should they have been stopped by the more general restrictions on free speech? Restrictions deemed necessary because they prevent injury and destruction? While both have resulted from their publication, I think the cartoons themselves, and the intent to publish them, cannot be shown to be responsible, either directly or indirectly. There was nothing in them that could in principle be seen as a cause of physical attack on person or property.

Of course they did cause a kind of damage, namely a personal one in that they offended and angered some people. And while in a civil society we have a responsibility to not cause this kind of harm, this does not mean that we can legislate against it. The reason we have the other laws is everyone is viewed to have a right to life and property, and this right has to be protected. But to prohibit causing offence would be to assume a right not to be offended, which while perhaps honourable, would never work. Any criticism or comment will always offend some people, but to restrict criticism would be to decide not just what material things should be protected, but which opinions This would indeed be a worrying direction to take, since limiting the freedom to criticize would rob us of the most basic right necessary for any freedom that matters, namely the right to be yourself, and this means holding one's own opinions. Modern society might prevent you acting (or inciting others to act) on those opinions, but the right to hold them must be sacrosanct.

This means Europe is not hypocritical in allowing offensive cartoons be published and also jailing a cleric for encouraging murder, but it is a trickier question how it can justify jailing somone for voicing the opinion that a historical event never happened. Perhaps a better way of looking at it is considering whether Irving really believes the holocaust never happened, or is just using his works to further a project, which in itself might cause harm. Viewed this way, it is his project which is being punished, not his opinion. But this is itself a slippery slope of interpretation, one we should be incredibly careful about stepping on to.

18 Feb '9 dead in cartoon riots'

a bizarre yet tragic headline that's become quite common in the last few weeks. I meant to write something about it when it first started to break out, but didn't have the time.

First, back to the original publishing of the cartoons. Personally I think that the newspapers had a right to publish, but perhaps a responsibility not to. The simple fact that something may offend can never be grounds for censorship - after all, it is fundamental to a free society that there is robust criticism and comment, and that's always bound to offend someone. That said, just because we can say anything, doesn't mean we should always say everything. Newspapers and journalists have an influence in society (those unelected legislators of mankind!?), and hence have responsibities. Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words might get other people's broken. If something is going to offend, and especially offend a significant section of society - then it has to be justified. In addition, the justification has to be stronger if there already is a sensitive climate about the matter, or to do with the section which might take offence. Satire about car dealers can be done with less introspection than satire on race or creed.

That said - were the cartoons justified? Some of them I think were just downright offensive - for example the one with Mohammed with a time-bomb turban. There is no witty insight here - since there is no logical basis to associate the founder of islam with what some of his misguided followers do. And even if Islam was initially a religion of conquest - so was Christianity at this time. Violence and 'terrorism' is not just a religious issue either - there have been many bombs dropped and planted 'legitimately' and not so legitimately in the name of secular causes.

The one with the line of suicide bombers turning up at paradise to be greeted with a 'stop,stop, we've run out of virgins'did at first make me laugh. But then again, I have to admit I've laughed at many a joke that I wouldn't want published. On the one hand it does make a satirical point - from some standpoints all religions are illogical, and especially in my view the ones that promise a world somehow different to this one, but yet with 'desirable' things from it. However, the problem I think with this joke is it appeals to a surface level of understanding of suicide bombers - that they just do it because they want the big pay off in paradise. I strongly believe however that religious conviction works slightly differently (it would be easier to overcome otherwise!) and more importantly, economic and social factors play a major role. I think religious ideals don't merely provide an incentive, but more often provide an outlet for built up frustration. This is something missed by the cartoon, and why it does pander to stereotypical conceptions about suicide bombings - and why in my view it is not respectable comment.

So respectable newspapers shouldn't have published them as such, at least before the controversy broke out. However when it did, I personally felt I had the right to know what all the fuss was about, and think it was right of papers to publish them afterwards, though maybe they could have somehow covered up mohammed, and referred to him indirectly - but would this have helped?

What is the real point of the story is however the reaction to it. The scary thing is it seems to have been portrayed in parts of the Islamic world as unfairly as they sometimes perceive themselves as being portrayed in the west. It was never 'us' insulting 'them'. It was a handful of individuals making a rather bad joke about 'them'. What worries me is how this all fed to easily into the hands of those on both sides who want to portray a 'clash of civilizations'. While I don't doubt that many in the muslim world (and muslims and non-muslims in the west) are angry about the cartoons, it is obvious in the more volatile areas like Palestine and Pakistan these feelings have been inflamed. Even in the riots, it struck me as odd that so many Danish flags were to hand. No doubt such places always have a handy stock of stars and stripes available, but I don't think even I in europe could get my hands on a full size Danish flag at short notice. Ok, this might be a small point, but I think all 'iconic' tv moments have to be approached with scepticism. Whether its toppling of statues or burning of flags.

Is this a sign of our times? Is there something it is indicative of - which we can do something about? Yes, and maybe. Definately the anger and frustration (often justified) in many parts of the world is something that has to be taken seriously. Given how they have been treated it is unsurprising that the anger of the Palestinians can flow out in all directions. But there is more to it then just that, because there are more people affected than just those living under the burden of occupation or poverty. The real problem is how these valid grounds for anger are inflamed with ideals and theologies into a more general alienation, even of sections with in our own society. I think in a way it is a reversion to tribalism, a sense of 'them' and 'us' which is natural in human nature, but not inevitable. It can and has been overcome by well constructed societies, but as those societies change, and become more interconnected with others that differ from them, both need to adapt.

A good example of something that can be natural but not inevitable is an experiment i read about regarding brain imaging of how people react to photos of someone from another race. The initial results showed that a part of the brain involved in aggression did indeed light up when people saw a face of a different race. This would seem to imply we are just naturally xenophobic, and while we might be able to control the behaviours with laws, we cannot control the instict. However in a more subtle extension of the test, subjects were primed to consider the face as an individual, for example by asking 'will the person in the next photo like celery?'. In such cases the relevant brain area did not light up. To me this shows how we can consciously change how we approach the world, and thereby modify how we unconsciously view it.
It seems a ridiculous question to ask, but we live in times when people are killed in 'cartoon riots'....so I wonder do suicide bombers like celery?

halftalk moves back to blogspot!

ok....after moving temporarily away to bloghi.com - this blog is now back here at blogspot!
(bloghi soon to disappear into cyber trashcan of history....)

the next few posts will be re-postings from the bloghi site...